Michigan Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 6

1952

INSURANCE-INTERPRETATION OF "ACCIDENTAL MEANS" IN
DOUBLE INDEMNITY CLAUSE
David W. Rowlinson S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David W. Rowlinson S.Ed., INSURANCE-INTERPRETATION OF "ACCIDENTAL MEANS" IN DOUBLE
INDEMNITY CLAUSE, 50 MICH. L. REV. 942 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss6/15

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

942

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

INSURANCE-INTERPRETATION op "AcCIDENTAL MBANs" IN DouBLB INCLAUSE-Insured engaged in a game called "Russian Roulette" in
which he removed all but one cartridge from the cylinder of a revolver, spun the
cylinder, placed the revolver to his head without ascertaining the position of the
cartridge, and pulled the trigger. The revolver fired, killing the insured. The
beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his life brought the present action to
recover under a provision providing double indemnity for death effected solely
through external, violent, and accidental means. The trial court directed a verdict for the insurance company. On appeal, held, affirmed. Such reckless
abandon and exposure to a known and obvious danger cannot be said to have
produced death by accidental means. Thompson 11. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, (Ga. App. 1951) 66 S.E. (2d) 119.
There are hundreds of cases in the reports construing the term "accidental
means" in double indemnity clauses of life and accident insurance policies. In
general, there are two lines of authority on the meaning of "accidental means."
One line of decisions places a literal construction on the term and distinguishes
DEMNITY
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accidental means from accidental results.1 Under this view, to recover under a
double indemnity provision for death by accidental means, it is not enough
that the insured's death is accidental in the sense that it is an unexpected, undesigned and unforeseen result; there must be something unforeseen, unexpected
and unusual in the acts or means which precede the result. Under this construction, if the death resulted directly from the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by any mischance, slip, or mishap in the doing of the act itself,
the death, though an accidental result, is not caused through accidental means. 2
The basis for this construction is that to give the same meaning to the term
"accidental means" as to the word "accidental" is to ignore the word "means,''
and this word should not be regarded as mere surplusage.3 The other line
of decisions, which represents the modem trend, although it still is the minority
view, either does not recognize any distinction between accidental means .and
accidental results, or repudiates any distinction as having no effect on the determination of the insurer's liability. 4 Under this view, if death was unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen, it is death by accidental means, even though the
result of a voluntary act performed by the insured without mishap, slip, or
mis~ance. This construction is based on two grounds: ( 1) these two terms
cannot be logically separated, for either there is an accident throughout or there
is no accident at all; 5 (2) the average policy purchaser probably regards the
terms as synonymous and has little conception of the metaphysics of cause and
effect. 6 The Georgia decisions, including the principal case, have consistently
distinguished between accidental means and accidental results; 7 however, the
1 Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life ·Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461 (1934);
Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. 406, 209 P. 26 (1922); Hassay v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 266, 43 N.E. (2d) 229 (1942); Fulton v. Metropolitan Casualty
Ins. Co., 19 Ga. App. 127, 91 S.E. 228 (1917); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Assn. v.
Blanton, 306 Ky. 16, 206 S.W. (2d) 70 (1947); O'Neill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
345 Pa. 232, 26 A. (2d) 898 (1942).
2 Mitchell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 136 Ohio St. 551, 27 N.E. (2d) 243 (1940)
(death caused by ruptured bowel from self-administered enema by attaching tube to city
water tap); Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 594, 174 P. (2d) 961
(1946) (death from coronary occlusion suffered while pushing a stalled automobile);
Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 1 (death from sunstroke while playing
golf).
3 McGinley v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 88 N.H. 108, 184 A. 593 (1936).
4 Dickerson v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co., 56 Ariz. 70, 105 P. (2d) 517 (1940);
O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152 P. (2d) 707 (1944); Goethe v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1936); Burr v. Commercial Travelers
Mutual Acc. Assn., 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E. (2d) 248 (1946). Many courts were influenced
by Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra
note 1, at 499, in which he said, "The attempted distinction between accidental results and
accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog." The Supreme
Court of Colorado commented, ''Whatever kind of bog that is we concur." Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231 at 235, 67 P. (2d) 80 (1937).
5 Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P. (2d) 372 (1935).
6 Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W. (2d) 576 (1942).
7 Atlanta Accident Assn. v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 30 S.E. 939 (1898); Fulton v.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., supra note l; American National Ins. Co. v. Chappelear,
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decision reached in the principal case would be the same regardless of the
approach used, for where the death is not an accidental result, the means are
_necessarily not accidental. Death occasioned by the insured's negligence is an
accidental death, 8 but where the insured pursues a voluntary and intentional
course of conduct from which death or serious bodily injury is an almost certain foreseeable consequence, the death is not deemed to be accidental, since
the actor is charged with a design of producing that result.9 In the only other
case found involving death from "Russian Roulette,'' the trial court's overruling of the insurance company's motion for a directed verdict was upheld.10
That case is distinguishable on its facts from the principal case because there was
evidence there that the insured thought he had removed all cartridges from the
revolver beforehand and also that the insured lost his balance and accidentally
discharged the gun while attempting to steady himself. From those facts, the
jury could have found that there was something both in the means and result
which was unforeseeable, unexpected, and unusual. In general, where the
insured has voluntarily·done an act which is intrinsically dangerous, and death,
though unintended, results, the courts have usually held that there can be no
recovery under the usual double indemnity clause.11 The principal case is of
this type. It is submitted that these decisions carry into the field of insurance
contracts something analogous to the tort doctrine of assumption of risk. Recovery on the double indemnity clause is properly denied, since death can hardly
be termed accidental where the insured virtually invites his own destruction.
David W. Rowlinson, S.Ed.

51 Ga. App. 826, 181 S.E. 808 (1935); Green v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 67 Ga. App.
520, 21 S.B. (2d) 465 (1942).
8 VmCJ1, hrsURANcB, 3d ed., §189 (1951); 5 CouCH, CYcLOPEDIA oP hrsURANCB
LAW §1138 (1929).
9 Zuliskey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 363, 48 A. (2d) 141 (1946) (insured
deliberately jumped from a moving automobile); Kinavey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 149 Pa.
Super. 568, 27 A. (2d) 286 (1942) (insured fell from a high bridge while performing
stunts on the bridge's guard railing); Postier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1, 158 P. 1022
(1916) (insured killed while committing armed robbery); Cutrell v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 550, 17 N.W. (2d) 465 (1945) (insured shot while attempting to
break into a house); Kalahan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 194 Misc. 87, 84 N.Y.S. (2d) 433
(1948) and Camp v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., Mo. App. (unreported) 165 S.W.
(2d) 277 (1942) (insured killed in self-defense by the person upon whom he was making
an assault with a deadly weapon); Ford v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 12 C.C.H. Ins. Law
Rep., 7(a) 89 discussed in Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571,
61 S.E. (2d) 579 (1950) (insured died as a result of snake bite while voluntarily handling
a rattlesnake during a religious ceremony).
10 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fagan, 292 Ky. 533, 166 S.W. (2d) 1007 (1942).
And see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kent, (6th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 685, where the insured
was killed while demonstrating to a friend how another had committed suicide. In the latter
case, the court held that the question of accidental means was properly submitted to the jury
since there was evidence that the insured believed the gun was unloaded.
11 See cases cited in note 9.

